

THE INDONESIAN IMPERATIVE

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

THE INDONESIAN IMPERATIVE

by

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ABSTRACT

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The U.S must improve relations with Indonesia because of Indonesia's improving democratic institutions, growing political power in Eastern Asia, strategic location, market potential—and because it is has the largest Muslim population of all the world's nations. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) describes the benefits of the National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP). It then examines Indonesia's role as a critical U.S. strategic partner and identifies risks if relations with Indonesia are not improved. It shows how the Hawaii National Guard's SPP can effectively augment current programs of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Pacific Command's Theater Security initiatives. It then proposes to expand the SPP through the addition of authorization and appropriate funding for the state-to-state component of the SPP, along with a discussion of arguments against improving the SPP. This SRP concludes with recommendations to strengthen SPPs.

THE INDONESIAN IMPERATIVE

In response to the rapidly changing strategic environment following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), in coordination with the National Guard Bureau, created a program that evolved into the State Partnership Program (SPP). USEUCOM established a Joint Contact Team (JCT)¹ in the Baltics composed of reserve component Soldiers and Airmen. This JCT's mission was intended to strengthen American interest in the fragile region – a program that would be threatening to Russia.² In 1993, the JCT grew into what is now known as the SPP, which was designed to support combatant commanders' Theater Security Cooperation Program (TSCP). The initial SPP paired individual U.S. states with the former Soviet republics of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In the following 14 years, the SPP expanded from USEUCOM to three other unified U.S. Combatant Commands: Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM), Central Command (USCENTCOM), and Pacific Command (USPACOM)³.

The SPP currently has 56 formal SPP agreements linking host countries with Guard units in 54 states and territories. However, a strategic gap exists within the USPACOM's Area of Responsibility (AOR) – the largest AOR of any of the combatant commands. USPACOM currently sponsors only four formal SPPs, a drastic gap compared to EUCOM's 26 partnerships and SOUTHCOM's 20 partnerships, and USCENTCOM's 6 partnerships.⁴ Recognizing the need to expand the SPP within the USPACOM's AOR, Hawaii's Governor Linda Lingle and Major General Robert G.F. Lee, State Adjutant General of the Hawaii National Guard, formally inaugurated a partnership with the Republic of Indonesia's Minister of Defense Dr. Juwono Sudarsono on 13 June

2007. The Hawaii National Guard thus assumed responsibility for a second SPP, since it also participated in a program with the Philippines.⁵ The addition of Indonesia into Hawaii National Guard's SPP and USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Program will strengthen the U.S. relationship with this strategically valuable country. However, funding and other resources have not yet been provided to support one of the SPP's crucial components – the state-to-state relationship. This Strategy Research Project (SRP) examines the benefits of SPPs, describes factors that make Indonesia a critical U.S. strategic partner, shows how the Hawaii National Guard's SPP can effectively augment current U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and USPACOM Theater Security Cooperation Programs, proposes an expansion of the SPP through authorization and appropriate funding for the state-to-state component of the SPP, along with a discussion of arguments against improving the SPP. This SRP concludes with recommendations to strengthen State Partnership Programs.

Relevance of the State Partnership Program

The National Guard Bureau's SPP mission is to enhance a regional combatant commanders' ability to build enduring military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civilian-to-civilian relationships that strengthen long-term international security while building positive relationships across all levels of the host country's society. To fulfill such a mission, the program has five primary objectives: improve military interoperability between the U.S. and partner militaries, strengthen civilian control of the military, assist with the development of democratic institutions, foster open market economies to help develop stability, and project U.S. humanitarian values.⁶ While the U.S. Armed Forces are constitutionally mandated to defend the U.S. and to fight the nation's wars, many

observers question the value of programs directed at improving another nation's government and armed forces.

Currently, the U.S. is viewed by many countries as an overbearing hegemonic power. U.S. policies toward Afghanistan and Iraq, which primarily utilize the military instrument of power, are fueling harsh antagonism and anti-American sentiment across the world, but especially within the Islamic world.⁷ To counter anti-Americanism, Joseph Nye, Jr., former Assistant Secretary of Defense, advocates the use of soft power to improve U.S. legitimacy and to preclude the need for coercive strategies. Nye defines soft power as the ability to get what you want by attracting others to your values and ideals and then persuading them to support or adopt your goals.⁸ A more recent report published by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, co-chaired by Nye and Richard Armitage, recommends that the U.S. must become a smarter power.⁹ The report specifies five critical areas that the U.S. should focus on: alliances, partnerships, and institutions; global development; public diplomacy; economic integration; and technology and innovation.

Military campaign plans provide an excellent opportunity for SPPs to achieve many smart power objectives prior to requiring "harder" deterrent options. In accordance with Joint Publication 3-0, the U.S. military relies on a six-phase model for planning campaigns. Phase 0 (Shape) is designed to dissuade or deter adversaries and to affirm or solidify relationships with friends and allies. However, if Phase 0 activities are unsuccessful, progressively stringent phases follow: Phase I, Deter; Phase II, Seize the Initiative; Phase III, Dominate; Phase IV, Stabilize; and Phase V, Enable Civil Authority. SPPs give COCOMs a way to carry out Phase 0 successfully: Partner with a developing

democratic country and solidify relationships to preclude the need for direct coercive measures.¹⁰ The SPP offers an excellent way for the U.S. to exercise soft or smart power before it is necessary to consider stringent measures, such as coercion or military action, to achieve policy objectives.

Indonesia's Strategic Importance

Indonesia is an important strategic partner to the U.S. for several reasons: Democracy is waning in the region, the Indonesian economy is growing, Indonesia plays a big part in the war on terrorism, and the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) are steadily increasing their capabilities. Democracy has no viable foothold in countries neighboring Indonesia. For example, in Myanmar the military junta's recent bloody crackdown against pro-democracy activists and the detainment of Aung San Suu Kyi shocked the international community. Similarly in Vietnam, officials arrested several pro-democracy activists in Ho Chi Minh City following a small surge of independent political activity in 2006.¹¹ Also in 2006, armed Fijian soldiers suspended publication of the Fijian Times, a local newspaper. The newspaper's publisher protested that the suspension of publication, under the Fijian constitution, violated protection of speech. In the Asia-Pacific region, there have been several other examples of democracy slipping toward a more autocratic rule. The 2006 National Security Strategy proclaims that:

It is the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world...The goal of our statecraft is to help create a world of democratic, well-governed states that can meet the need of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.¹²

To promote democracy in this volatile region, the U.S. must cultivate Indonesia as a strong U.S. ally and help develop that country into a stable democracy.

Furthermore, according to the U.S. Department of State:

The U.S. has important economic, commercial, and security interests in Indonesia. Indeed it remains a “linchpin of regional security due to its strategic location astride a number of key international maritime straits,” particularly the Malacca Strait.¹³

A growing market economy, a strong military, and active foreign policies indicate that Indonesia intends to be a regional power in East Asia. “Indonesian economy is on a roll, with strong 6% GDP growth.”¹⁴ Its strong economy and relatively stable government enables Indonesia to invest in its military and look beyond domestic issues to regional affairs. Furthermore, Indonesia’s large military exhibits an increased capability to operate outside of its borders. In addition, the Indonesian government’s foreign policy demonstrates its intent to be a regional power in East Asia. In August 1967, Indonesia – in conjunction with Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines – formed the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).¹⁵ This regional organization then developed a plan for economic growth, security and peace, and improved cooperation. “After an international rehabilitative period, Indonesia rejoined the community of nations, broke the Jakarta-Hanoi-Beijing-Pyongyang axis, ended the Indonesian-Malaysian Confrontation (Konfrontasi), worked to establish ASEAN, forged cooperative non-threatening links with its neighbors, and became a moderating voice in Third World forums.”¹⁶ These accomplishments are indeed indicators of Indonesia’s regional leadership.

Indonesia is also the world’s fourth most populous nation with approximately 245.5 million people, of whom an estimated 88% are Muslim. This makes Indonesia the largest Muslim country in the world.¹⁷ Thus, Indonesia is an important counter-terrorism asset to the U.S. because the U.S. has an opportunity to gain the support of moderate

Indonesian Muslims, who could then help to prevent the spread of radical-Islamic messages around the world.

The U.S. role in this effort is to support, where appropriate, and encourage and amplify the voices of moderates who oppose extremists and continue to encourage democracy, freedom, and economic prosperity in societies.¹⁸

In addition to stopping the spread of radical Islamic messages, the United States should assist the Indonesian government in countering radical Islamic views and denying a safe haven to terrorists. Indonesia is a vast archipelago with many secluded islands, so terrorists can train and operate there well under the radar. Indeed a few terrorist organizations currently operate within Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is affiliated with Al Qaeda, is the region's largest terrorist organization:

Jemaah Islamiyah has developed its own funding mechanisms, including charities, front companies, donations, hawala (underground banking), gold and gem smuggling, and petty crime to support its operations.¹⁹

Since 2000, JI has successfully bombed several western targets. The most notable is the 2002 Bali bombing that killed 202 and injured around 300 people. The Indonesia government, TNI and police have cracked down on JI, but this terrorist organization still has the ability to attack soft targets. If aggressive counter-terrorist activities are not sustained in Indonesia, JI and other trans-national terrorist organizations may once again be able grow and spread throughout the region.

Counter-terrorism is not the only capability that Indonesia's military is capable of providing. There is also great potential for increasing TNI's support of United Nations (UN) operations worldwide. Approximately 398,000 personnel serve in TNI's Army, Navy, Air Force, and National Air Defense forces²⁰ The TNI has participated in peacekeeping operations in many parts of the world, including in the Congo in the 1960s, Vietnam in the 1970s, and Cambodia, the Philippines, and Bosnia in the 1990s.

Additionally, the TNI participated in the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) in 1957 and UNEF II in the Sinai region in 1974. Most recently in 2006, the TNI sent nearly a thousand troops and several hundred pieces of equipment in support of the United Nations Interim Peace Keeping Force to Lebanon. Because Indonesia is a predominantly Muslim country, the TNI is well-suited for UN operations in other Muslim countries in the Middle East or Africa.

In addition to increasing its capability to support international requirements, the TNI must also improve on its capability to support the Indonesian government with domestic recovery and relief operations. With its vast coastlines, Indonesia occupies a vulnerable Pacific “Ring-of-Fire Zone” where two continental tectonic plates meet, making this archipelago nation vulnerable to earthquakes and tsunamis. This vulnerability was dramatically evident in December 2004 when an earthquake that measured 9.0 on the Richter scale generated a series of large tsunamis in the Indian Ocean.²¹ The 2004 tsunami caused catastrophic damage in Indonesia, India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Myanmar, killing an estimated 225,000. The majority of the victims, an estimated 129,775 that died and 38,786 that are still classified as missing, are from Indonesia.²² According to the April 2005 United Nations Humanitarian Appeal, Consolidated Appeals Process, it will take an estimated \$396,890,823 (US) to support Indonesia’s recovery from the devastation of the December 2004 earthquake and tsunami.²³ In December 2004, the U.S. government pledged \$350 million for humanitarian and recovery assistance. The U.S. pledged \$405 million to the Tsunami Recovery and Reconstruction Fund.²⁴

The SPP can be an excellent instrument to improve Indonesia's ability to prepare for and respond to natural disasters. Even as aid was pouring into Indonesia, another powerful earthquake struck on 27 May 2006, causing major damage and killing an estimated 5,744 people. The U.S. government provided \$300,000 to support victims displaced by this earthquake.²⁵ Because of Indonesia's vulnerability to earthquakes, tsunamis, and other natural disasters common to islands, disaster preparedness and disaster risk reduction must be high on Indonesia's priority list. Both the Indonesian government and TNI would benefit from better disaster preparedness and risk reduction measures. This SRP will describe how the SPP could better prepare Indonesia disaster preparedness. In the future, Indonesia will be less dependent on relief from the international community, non-governmental organizations, and other external sources as a result of Indonesia's improved disaster response capabilities

Strategic Risk if Relations with Indonesia are Not Improved

As Indonesia continues to increase its power in the region, Indonesia also seeks to build strong relations with more powerful nations. There is a considerable probability that other world powers such as Russia and China, whose views are not necessarily aligned with the U.S., may seek to strengthen their relations with Indonesia. Indonesian associations with other non-Western world powers may be detrimental to U.S. national interests. Russia and China constantly seek to increase their power and status. Recently, both countries have executed policies and initiated actions designed to increase their power, while attempting to reduce U.S. power and influence. Indonesia has vast resources, especially petroleum – which China seeks. China also wants to limit Western influence in East Asia. In November 2004 and again in April 2005, President

Hu Jintao of China and Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono met to discuss future strategic partnership agreements designed to increase trade, investment, and maritime cooperation.²⁶ Such agreements, given China's potential for taking a leading role in the region, could create conflict with the U.S. as both major powers vie for leadership in the global economy. China's ability to exert greater influence over Indonesia could likewise undermine U.S. security interest in the region.

Like China, Russia is also increasing its relations with Indonesia. On 7 September 2007, President Vladimir Putin signed a \$1 billion arms deals with Indonesia as part of a Kremlin strategy to expand its influence in Asia. According to the Indonesian president, the Russian arms deals benefit Indonesia because the weapons come without the "normal constraints" imposed when dealing with the U.S., which requires receiving countries to meet certain standards, especially in the realm of human rights. So U.S. arms deals usually come with license agreements.²⁷ With China and Russia gaining influence in East Asia, the U.S. should not sit back and wait. The U.S. should urgently identify the opportunities that can be leveraged through engaging Indonesia while assessing the potential risks of ignoring the island nation.

Benefit of Improving Hawaii National Guard's SPP with Indonesia

There are indeed compelling reasons for the U.S to improve relations with Indonesia. If the U.S. waits too long, China or Russia may supplant Western interest in Indonesia. Because the U.S. must not attempt to bully its way into Indonesia, agreements like the SPP can be used as a soft or smart tool during Phase 0 efforts. More importantly, there are opportunities for the SPP to augment existing U.S. government or military programs in the region. The SPP can be an excellent tool to

support national and Theater Combatant Commander objectives. To succeed, the Hawaii National Guard's SPP in Indonesia must be closely coordinated with programs of other U.S. governmental agencies, especially the Department of State and USAID, and with the USPACOM's Theater Security Cooperation Program.

As mentioned earlier, one of the goals of the SPP is to represent U.S. humanitarian values. Bilateral relations between the U.S. and Indonesia suffered in the early 1990s primarily due to Indonesian security forces' human rights abuses in East Timor. Lack of civilian control of the military prevented the Indonesian government from holding military personnel accountable for human rights atrocities. The U.S. Congress subsequently cut off International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding for Indonesia in response to human rights violations. Military assistance programs and bilateral relations then resumed in November 2005 after the U.S. Department of State concluded that the Indonesian government had taken appropriate action against the perpetrators of the human rights violations.

Re-establishment of normalized relations with Indonesia allowed the USAID to pursue initiatives that enhance the capacities of 57 local Indonesian governments. These initiatives included: improving civil society and the media, integrated planning and budgeting, local government management, citizen-focused service delivery, resource management and mobilization, and participatory governance.²⁸ Hawaii and the Hawaii National Guard, engaging through its SPP, can strongly support USAID and USPACOM objectives. Hawaii's SPP with Indonesia could be designed to demonstrate the advantage of subordination of the military to civil authorities, thereby convincing the Indonesian government to exercise more control over their military and security forces.

Strengthening the civilian government's control over the military would promote democratic governance and would reduce the likelihood of future human rights violations by Indonesian military and security forces. For example, on 29 November 2007, earlier training provided by the Hawaii Army National Guard as part of the SPP helped the Philippine authorities end a coup attempt.²⁹

In addition, USAID is still involved in reconstruction efforts in Indonesia following the devastating 2004 earthquake and tsunami. Hawaii National Guard units, especially the 230th Engineer Company, are capable of supporting many USAID projects, such as rebuilding shelters and public buildings and making improvements to key infrastructure, including roads. Both the Hawaii Army and Air National Guard medical units can contribute to disaster response and other developmental programs, with several other Guard units capable of supporting USAID or other governmental organizations. But military units are not the only asset that the Guard can offer. Individual Hawaiian Soldiers and Airmen have a wide range of civilian skills and experience that transfer directly to reconstruction and development programs. These Soldiers and Airmen are general contractors, construction workers, electricians, plumbers, government leaders, and much more.³⁰ USPACOM, USAID, or other governmental agencies should coordinate with the Hawaii National Guard to assess the feasibility of Guard Soldiers filling critical personnel shortfalls for external program requirements. The Guard's potential to use the SPP to augment other agencies' programs is great.

The Hawaii National Guard's SPP with Indonesia is in a fledgling state, so several of USPACOM's Theater Security Programs can be augmented as the Hawaii Guard's SPP matures. USPACOM should consider assigning the Hawaii National

Guard to participate in reciprocal visits, staff information exchanges, personnel exchanges, individual training, and small unit training. Moreover, the Hawaii National Guard would be most beneficial in assisting the TNI with military professional development, large unit exercises, and disaster preparedness.

The IMET allows foreign military personnel to participate in U.S.-sponsored training in order to increase their professionalism, strengthen their respect for democratic values and human rights, and improve Indonesia's ongoing cooperation with the U.S. military. The Hawaii Army National Guard's 298th Regional Training Institute (298th RTI) has been accredited by various agencies including TRADOC, the Sergeants Major Academy, and active duty proponent schools.³¹ U.S. Active Duty Soldiers and Reservists attend Non-Commissioned Officer courses at the 298th RTI. Allowing TNI military personnel to attend the 298th RTI, under authority of IMET, would greatly enhance the partnership between the Hawaii National Guard and the TNI.

In April 2006, the Hawaii Army National Guard (HIARNG) provided a nine-man battalion staff response cell – along with units from the 9th Regional Readiness Command (RRC), United States Army Reserve and the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division – to participate in the first combined brigade-level staff readiness and cooperation exercise (Garuda Shield) with the TNI. This exercise, designed in the context of an UN-led peace-keeping operational environment, became the first brigade-level, military-to-military exercise with the TNI in over 17 years.³² While the Garuda Shield exercise fits perfectly into the SPP model, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)³³ did not include HIARNG units in the initial exercise design. USARPAC later decided to include a HIARNG unit primarily due to the high operational tempo of the 25th Infantry

Division.³⁴ The 9th RRC served as the executive agent for Garuda Shield and was responsible for the overall planning, coordination, and execution of the exercise. The HIARNG's role in Garuda Shield will expand in 2008. The 29th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, HIARNG, will assign nearly 50 personnel to support the brigade and battalion response cell requirement. Likewise, the HIARNG should be designated the executive agent for the Garuda Shield exercise in future years. Hawaii Guard leadership will enhance military-to-military relations with the TNI at the brigade and higher levels. In addition, funding for the exercise is provided by the National Guard Bureau (NGB) and USARPAC.³⁵ Thus HIARNG would be able to conduct SPP with Indonesia without the need for additional SPP funds.

Nonetheless, the greatest benefit that the Hawaii National Guard offers is its capability and experience in Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) during natural disasters. In the past 15 years alone, the Hawaii National Guard supported the State of Hawaii during 51 significant DSCA activities. Most notable were the September 1992 Hurricane Iniki Relief Operations, the May 2001 Asian Development Bank Conference support, the September 2001 Airport Security Support following the 9-11 terrorist attacks, and the October 2006 Island of Hawaii Earthquake Relief Operations.³⁶ The Hawaii National Guard was the lead agency for the recovery operations. The Hawaii National Guard formed and operated Joint Task Forces in support of the State of Hawaii, other government agencies, and law enforcement agencies for security operations. Because Indonesia and Hawaii are comprised of islands, they both share common vulnerabilities in that both are susceptible to hurricanes and tsunamis. Thus

both Indonesia and Hawaii could both benefit from collaborative efforts in disaster planning, disaster preparedness, and risk reduction measures.

Hawaii's SPP with Indonesia got off to an excellent start. Governor Lingle's delegation included Major General Robert Lee as well as representatives from Hawaii's Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism; the Department of Health; the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center; University of Hawaii's East-West Center; the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies; and Hawaii's House of Representatives. During her three-day visit to Indonesia, Governor Lingle and her delegation met with Vice President Jusuf Kalla, Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, and other Indonesian senior leaders. They discussed opportunities and trade prospects; they considered mutual cooperation on a variety of issues related to security, stability, and economic prosperity. During the visit, Dr. Chip McCreery from the Pacific Tsunami Warning Center visited the Indonesian Tsunami Warning Center and Indonesian scientists to explore possible Hawaii-Indonesia partnerships.³⁷

SPP Shortfall and Recommendations for Improvement

Despite the benefits of improved relations as a result of a formalized and mature SPP, there is a shortfall in the current funding construct of the SPP. Funding is not provided to support state-to-state engagements. So security cooperation goals must be accomplished with existing resources. The National Guard Bureau, states, and various National Guard units are using innovative ways to obtain funding and other resources to support state-to-state activities. The National Guard Bureau is exploring new alternatives to leverage funding and gain support of other agencies like the USAID,

Department of State, United States Department of Agriculture, etc. According to Lieutenant Colonel Michael Golden, Chief, Operations Branch, NGB J-5 IA:

The challenge before us is how to most effectively identify appropriate agencies/organizations and funding streams so that NGB can act as a funding/information clearing house for the states and their partners.³⁸

Nevertheless, ad hoc scrambles for resources to support state-to-state initiatives should not become the routine. Legislation that authorizes and provides funds to support state-to-state initiatives as part of the SPP should to be enacted. To get such enabling legislation, the NGB should convince the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) to lead the legislative charge. Further, strategic leaders must advocate the potential of SPPs, and an aggressive information campaign should educate and garner the support of state governors and the larger public.³⁹

The NGB should submit a resolution to the NGAUS for inclusion in the NGAUS Legislative Objectives for Preparation of the 2010 Budget. The resolution should urge Congress to enact legislation authorizing and funding state-to-state programs within the SPP. NGAUS should be the lead legislative sponsor because of its strong lobbying capability. Indeed NGAUS legislative department's mission is to be the best advocate for the National Guard. It is responsible for managing and assisting the NGAUS resolutions and task force processes; for working closely with NGB, state associations, industry, Department of Defense (DOD), Congressional National Guard Caucuses, adjutants general, governors, veterans associations, and others to achieve our legislative objectives; for producing legislative publications; and for lobbying Congress to promote the NGAUS legislative agenda.⁴⁰

Concurrently, military leaders—preferably from the NGB, combatant command, joint staff, and DOD – must justify the priorities and effectiveness of current TSCP and

SPP operations to encourage the enactment and financing of new legislation that will meet future needs and priorities. The process of getting senior leader support must start with the National Guard Bureau's senior leaders. The Guard's Army, Air, and Joint leadership should aggressively work with senior DOD leaders to share the successes of the SPP and, more importantly, to justify improving the state-to-state component of the SPP. Likewise, the adjutants general and other senior leaders from the states should engage their active component counterparts to gather additional support. Ultimately, the entire military and DOD should speak with one voice in persuading Congress to enact new legislation authorizing and funding state-to-state programs. The state adjutants general should also gather strong support from their governors to push for new legislation providing authorization and funding for state-to-state initiatives.

Finally, the message must get out to the larger community. The National Guard Bureau should devise and publish an aggressive strategic communications plan designed to inform the public on the benefits of the SPP and to gain support for the new legislation to improve the SPP. Leaders should spread the message to their Soldiers and Airmen, because they can also help to get the message out. The National Guard has a unique ability to build grassroots support because they come from and belong to the civilian community. However, the media provides the best and quickest way to get the message out. But media advertising is very expensive. So the strategic communications plan could suggest some innovative ways for getting the media to run the message for a reduced cost – or for free. The media often produces “good news stories” that run at the end of the newscast. Some media outlets would gladly run the

“good news story” that illustrates the benefits of the SPP, and more importantly, what must be done to improve it.

If legislative funding for state-to-state SPPs is approved, it should include measures to ensure effective fiscal stewardship. The program should provide an open allotment managed by NGB J-5 International Affairs (IA) section in accordance with strict guidelines set by the Department of Defense and Department of the Army, with a precise budget for each activity. The NGB J-5 IA should provide oversight and monitor monthly expenditure reports, thereby ensuring that obligations and disbursements conform to SPP requirements. Funding would support travel and per diem; transportation to and from conferences, meetings, or training sites; expenses of Class 2 administrative and house-keeping supplies; paper; lease/rental of equipment and services; and equipment and supplies incidental to SPP.

The NGB J-5 IA would submit and justify budget packages for inclusion in the President’s Budget. The NGB J-5 IA would also submit the Program Objective Memorandum to the Office of the Secretary of Defense in revisions to the Defense Fiscal Guidance, as required.⁴¹ Forecasting for future annual budget requirements should be done in coordination with the states, based on projected state-to-state events.

The states’ State Partnership Directors (SPD) must work with the state governments or other civilian agencies to ensure that the proposed state-to state initiative complies with the objectives of the SPP.⁴² Upon receiving approval from the Adjutant General, the SPDs would then submit a request, including a budget request, to the respective combatant command and NGB J-5 IA for approval to conduct a state-to-state event. NGB J-5 IA would then submit a Military Interdepartmental Purchase

Request⁴³ to the SPD's Government Purchase Card for execution. Upon completion of the event, the SPD would submit a finalized budget execution report to the NGB J-5 IA for reconciliation.

Arguments against Improving the SPP

Some critics will oppose expanding the SPP and creating separate funding for state-to-state events. For example, Secretary Harvey and General Schoomaker quickly cite competing fiscal priorities:

The Army will remain engaged around the globe, while operating in a constrained fiscal environment. This will continue to limit the resources available for both current and future challenges.⁴⁴

The current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and DoD's priority to accelerate modularization of the Army consumes a large portion of the defense spending. So budgetary pressures will likely make the DoD and Army senior leadership reluctant to support authorization and funding for a new program. This is why the NGB, supported by leaders in the 54 states and territories, and NGAUS must collectively break down barriers and advocate the value of the SPP.

Moreover, the NGB J-5 IA is currently working with the Office of the Secretary of Comptroller and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Office of the Assistant Secretary for Homeland Defense (OASD-HD) to secure permanent annual funding and legal authorizations for the SPP.⁴⁵ Lack of permanent funding for the SPP constrains the NGB J-5 IA, which must focus most of its energy on iteratively obtaining the authorization and funding for military-to-military and military-to-state programs. Exclusion of state-to-state funding may seem justified because most states' SPPs are currently not mature enough to realize the benefits of well-developed state-to-state

initiatives. Likewise, NGB and the states have utilized innovative, ad hoc methods to fund past state-to-state projects. Nonetheless, NGB should press on and request authorization and funding that includes on-going state-to-state provisions. It is best to push for funding for the entire program when there are supporters within the OSD.

Other potential adversaries to the SPP are non-believers in soft or smart power. These hawks continually promote and justify using the military as the primary means to achieve the U.S. objectives.⁴⁶ These are the critics that advocate war and do not see the benefit of utilizing smart power to achieve policy goals.

Lastly, some human rights advocates may oppose the SPP – especially in Indonesia – because they feel that U.S. intentions in Indonesia are disingenuous and focused on other strategic interests like petroleum and access. Many human rights advocates also feel that Indonesia should not benefit from formal relations with the U.S. in light of Indonesia's long history of human rights violations. For example, the Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the U.S State Department have released country reports describing recent human rights abuses in Indonesia. Without doubt, Indonesia has a long history of human rights abuses conducted by their armed forces.⁴⁷ In addition, Indonesia is in the international spotlight for torture and ill-treatment of prisoners,⁴⁸ for failure to address the human rights crimes of the Suharto era,⁴⁹ for supporting its military through a sprawling network of legal and illegal businesses, for laws limiting freedom of expression that are still used by authorities to target outspoken critics, for increasing incidents of religious intolerance, for failure to enforce labor standards,⁵⁰ for harsh prison conditions, and for trafficking in persons.⁵¹ But the Indonesian government has undertaken several recent actions to address human rights

issues. Most notably, “in early 2006, Indonesia acceded to both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which are the bedrock instruments of international human rights law.”⁵² So it is justifiable, in view of Indonesia’s improvements in human rights and the U.S. economic, commercial, and security interests in the region, to maintain normalized relations with Indonesia.

Conclusion

In view of Indonesia’s improving democratic institutions, growing political power in Eastern Asia, strategic location, market potential, and home to the largest Muslim population of all the world’s nations, the United States should cultivate Indonesia as a strategic partner well into the 21st century. However, the U.S should refrain from utilizing coercive methods to achieve policy goals. Instead, the U.S. should utilize the SPP as a tool to improve U.S. relations with Indonesia. If the U.S. refuses to engage with Indonesia, other powerful nations that do not share U.S. interests will. Although some oppose the expansion of relations with Indonesia, the SPP will enable Indonesian leaders, at all levels, to continue that nation’s economic, democratic, and human rights progress. To do this effectively, changes must be made in SPP’s budget authority to strengthen the state-to-state component of the SPP. The State of Hawaii and the Hawaii National Guard are an excellent choice and are well suited to partner with the island nation of Indonesia. Hawaii’s government and National Guard are well-suited to assist Indonesia in improving military interoperability between the U.S. and the TNI, to promote the subordination of the military to civil authorities, to assist with the development of democratic institutions, and to foster open market economies. It is

imperative that the U.S. continues to improve its relationship with Indonesia because of the strategic risk to the United States' national interest if political stability, economic growth, and counter-terrorism efforts and other key goals shared with Indonesia fail.

Endnotes

¹ The Joint Contact Team Program is a USEUCOM security cooperation activity that orients DOD organizations with host nation militaries. The JCT program supports theater objectives of stability, democratization, military professionalism, closer relationships with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and for the new NATO members preparing for NATO integration.

² National Guard Bureau J-5 International Affairs Division, "National Guard Bureau State Partnership Program Information Paper," available from <http://www.ngb.army.mil/ia/Tab2.aspx>; internet; accessed 27 November 2007.

³ Ibid.

⁴ All 54 states and territories have formal SPPs with the exception of Idaho, Iowa, Oregon, and South Carolina. The SPP is projected to expand. MG Robert Lee, the Adjutant General of the Hawaii National Guard, and LTG H Steven Blum, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, co-hosted the first-ever two-day Pacific State Partnership Program Regional Workshop in Honolulu on 24 January 2008. As a result, the state of Oregon is currently in the final stages of formalizing a partnership with the county of Bangladesh.

⁵ The addition of Indonesia to Hawaii's SPP made Hawaii only the fifth state or territory to partner with a second country. The other states with two partner countries are California, Maryland, Ohio, Florida, and the Territory of Puerto Rico.

⁶ The National Guard Bureau J-5 International Affairs Division, *Draft National Guard Security Cooperation and State Partnership Program Staff Officer's Guide*; available from <https://gkoportal.ngb.army.mil/sites/J5/IA/default.aspx>; Internet; accessed 14 September 2007, 74.

⁷ The Instruments of National Power are Diplomacy, Information, Military, and Economic, otherwise referred to as DIME.

⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Soft Power: The Changing Nature of Power* (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2004): 5-12.

⁹ CSIS Commission on Smart Power, *A Smarter More Secure America* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 5.

¹⁰ U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Operations*, Joint Publication 3-0 (Washington D.C.: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 17 September 2006), IV 26 - IV 27.

¹¹ Matt Steinglass, "Vietnam Continues Crackdown on Dissidents," *News Voice of America Com*, 1 December 2007, [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.voanews.com/english/2007-12-01-voa16.cfm>; Internet; accessed 1 December 2007.

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¹⁴ United States Pacific Command, *2007 Asia Pacific Economic Update*, Vol. II, (n.p: U.S. Pacific Command, 2007): 63.

¹⁵ Association of Southeast Asian Nations, "Overview, Association of Southeast Asian Nations," available from <http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

¹⁶ Mongabay.com, "Indonesia, Government and Politics;" available from http://www.mongabay.com/reference/country_studies/indonesia/GOVERNMENT.html; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Peter Pace, *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism* (Washington D.C.: The Pentagon, February 2006), 20.

¹⁹ Zachary Abuza, "Funding Terrorism in Southeast Asia: The Financial Network of Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah," *The National Bureau of Asian Research* 14, no. 5 (December 2003): 5.

²⁰ Structure and branches of the TNI and end-strength obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*; available from <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/id.html>; Internet; accessed 5 December 2007.

²¹ "NOAA Reacts Quickly to Indonesian Tsunami," December 2004; available from <http://www.noaa.gov/stories2004/s2357.htm>; Internet; accessed 9 December 2007.

²² Relief Web, *Asia Tsunami Response: Final Report 2004-2007*, 3 December 2007; available from <http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/KHII-79K3AA?OpenDocument&query=tsunami>; Internet; accessed 9 December 2007.

²³ United nations, "Indian Ocean Earthquake-Tsunami Flash Appeal: (Regional, Indonesia, Maldives, Myanmar, Seychelles, Somalia and Sri Lanka)," Mid-Term Review; 6 April 2005; available from <http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2005/webpage.asp?MenuID=5435&Page=1191>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2007.

²⁴ *USAID Tsunami Reconstruction, USAID Rebuilds Lives after the Tsunami*; available from http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/tsunami/; Internet; accessed 10 December 2007.

²⁵ U.S. Agency for International Aid, "Indonesia, U.S. to Provide Additional Funds to Help Victims of Earthquakes on Sumatra: 19 September 2007; available from <http://indonesia.usaid.gov/en/Article.284.aspx>; Internet; accessed 10 December 2007.

²⁶ "China and Indonesia Seal Strategic Pact," *International Herald Tribune, Asia - Pacific*, 26 April 2005 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2005/04/25/news/indonesia.php>; Internet; accessed 17 December 2007.

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³⁰ The Department of Defense, Reserve Affairs manages the Civilian Employer Information (CEI) – a database that requires Guard members to register information on their employers and their job skills.

³¹ Hawaii Army National Guard 298th Regional Training Institute Home Page; available from <http://www.dod.state.hi.us/hianrg/298rti/298rti/index.html>; Internet; 8 December 2007.

³² MAJ Baire Harms, "After Action Review, Garuda Shield," briefing slides provided by U.S. Army Pacific, G-3,5,7, Exercise Branch, Fort Shafter, HI., 16 July 2007.

³³ The U.S. Army Pacific is the Army component to USPACOM headquartered at Fort Shafter, Hawaii.

³⁴ During this period, the majority of the 25th Infantry Division was deployed to Iraq and the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 25th Infantry Division was undergoing reorganization.

³⁵ The National Guard Bureau provides exercise funding to support pay and allowances, travel, and per diem during the exercise. USARPAC provides funding for travel and per diem for the exercise design, initial, mid, and final planning conferences.

³⁶ LtCol Frederick Fogel, "Hawaii National Guard, Defense Support to Civil Authorities, Homeland Defense," briefing slides with scripted commentary, Fort Ruger, Joint Force Headquarters-Hawaii, Hawaii National Guard, 31 October 2006.

³⁷ "Hawaii, Indonesia Build Disaster Preparedness Partnership," *Environment News Service*, 15 June 2007 [newspaper on-line]; available from <http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jun2007/2007-06-13-09.asp>; Internet; accessed 25 September 2007.

³⁸ LtCol Michael Golden, Chief Operations Branch, NGB J-5 IA, email message to author, 6 December 2007.

³⁹ NGAUS is a nonpartisan organization representing nearly 45,000 current and former Army and Air National Guard officers from the 54 states and territories of the United States.

⁴⁰ National Guard Association of the United States, *Strategic Vision 2012*, (Washington, D.C.: n.p., n.d.), 12.

⁴¹ The DoD budget submitted for inclusion in the President's Budget is a product of its Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). DoD prepares a Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) spanning six years. See United States Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management: *How the Army Runs*, 25th Ed. 2005-2006, Carlisle, PA, 131-171.

⁴² The State Partnership Director is the state's representative responsible for planning, coordinating, and executing each state's respective SPP.

⁴³ The Military Interdepartmental Purchase Request (MIPR) is a method for transferring funds among U.S. military organizations. It allows for multi-organizational cooperative efforts to be performed, rather than limiting funding to a single organization.

⁴⁴ Francis J. Harvey and Peter J. Schoomaker, *A Campaign Quality Army with Joint and Expeditionary Capabilities: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, Fiscal Year 2007*, Posture Statement presented to the 110th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, 2007), 3.

⁴⁵ "FY08 State Partnership Program Way-Ahead," handout, Washington, D.C., NGB J-5 IA, 27 September 2007.

⁴⁶ Hawk is word used by Thomas Ricks in his book *Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq* to describe advocates of the war in Iraq.

⁴⁷ In 1999, TNI and local paramilitaries massacred more than 1,400 East Timorese. A recent Human Rights Watch report found that the Indonesian military continues to raise money outside the government budget through corruption and a sprawling network of legal and illegal businesses. This self-financing undermines civilian control, contributes to abuse of power by the armed forces and impedes reform.

⁴⁸ Amnesty International: *Report 2007, The State of the World's Human Rights*, available from <http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Asia-Pacific/Indonesia>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2007.

⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2007: Indonesia* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2007), 277-280.

⁵⁰ U.S. State Department, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, *Indonesia, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2006*, 6 March 2007; available from <http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78774.htm>; Internet; accessed 11 November 2007.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Asian Legal Resource Center, "Indonesia, Human Rights Council Elections: Urged to Live up to Commitments," 16 May 2007; available from http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/alrc_statements/416/; Internet; accessed 12 November 2007.

